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Abstract
This paper develops a new understanding of equity-based compensation schemes, such as
employee stock option plans. Current literature views such schemes as a measure aimed
at motivating the recipient employees to work harder for the firm. Under such a view, this
remuneration method either complements or substitutes other measures used to monitor
the performance of the recipient employees. In contrast, this paper proposes that the
recipient employee be viewed as the potential monitor of other employees and that stock
options (or similar types of compensation) motivate her to fulfill this task. This view has
many applications and can shed light on persistent puzzles, including why there is
sweeping use of stock ownership plans by many new economy firms. No junior employee
at Microsoft or Intel can improve the value of her heavyweight employer to such a degree
that it will make it worthwhile for her to work harder once stock options are offered.
Nevertheless, given the sensitivity of the "knowledge industry" to leakage of its
intellectual property, all employees can add much to the company's value by standing on
guard against such leakage. If technology is both a vulnerable and critical asset for the
organization, option recipients will be alert in protecting against infringement. Since not
much effort needs to be exerted to monitor their peers and supervisors to prevent this
significant harm, incentive compensations can easily motivate employees to perform their
monitoring task. Many other applications of this new view that cannot be explained by
the current literature are discussed in the paper.
I. Introduction
The literature explains that broad-based employee stock option plans, as well as
other types of stock-based compensation, are designed primarily to motivate employees
to exert greater effort. This paper questions this traditional and widely accepted view and
supplements it with another justification for such a type of compensation. Stock options
“privatize” the firm’s monitoring task into the hands of its employees. Every employee
who is equipped with stock-based compensation is motivated to monitor other
employees, including the employee’s supervisor, to make sure that her peers do not harm
the firm. This view of options turns the traditional understanding on its head. Instead of
emphasizing the role of options in alleviating the burden of monitoring recipient
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employees, the proposed view, which I term “reverse monitoring,” underlines the role of
those employees as monitors of other employees.1
This view may shed light on several puzzles that the traditional literature does not
answer in a satisfactory manner. 2 For one, it may explain why many “new economy”
firms grant across-the-board stock-based compensation.3 The traditional account explains
that efforts of employees in this industry sector are especially valuable but hardly
measurable. However, it is doubtful whether the contribution of the ordinary engineer at
Microsoft has a meaningful enough effect on the value of Microsoft stock for this
argument to hold. In contrast, the reverse monitoring argument explains that Microsoft
stock may, indeed, suffer salient damages if its employees tamper or transfer its highly
valuable source code or other proprietary intellectual property. Stock-based compensation
provides a powerful incentive for the recipients to monitor their fellow employees against
such behavior. And these employees have the ability to fulfill this monitoring task much
more efficiently than any other, outside agent. In some cases, this view justifies granting
options to many employees, not only to the highly creative ones or those at the top of the
pyramid. From this perspective, Intel’s longstanding policy of granting options to all
employees is understandable and far from naive.4 Simply put, in many high-tech firms,
option grants are one measure for preventing intellectual property leakage or sabotage
among many other efforts that these firms make to preserve this precious and vulnerable
asset.
One recent study clearly presents the challenge that broad-based employee option
plans pose for the traditional literature:
“However, many firms also offer firm-wide stock options and
profit sharing plans that provide even less incentive than executive
plans – after all, most workers can expect to reap a very minimal
amount of personal gain from their contribution to firm value or
profits. Given the free-rider problems associated with group
compensation plans, their prevalence is puzzling.”5
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In agency theory terms, and as shall be further discussed, this means that the costs associated with
option grants to employees are monitoring costs and not bonding costs. See Michael C. Jensen & William
H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structures, 4 J.
FIN. ECON. 305-60 (1976).
2
Elsewhere I discussed the outcomes of incentive pay in a different context. See Sharon Hannes, A
Demand-Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses, 35 J. Legal Stud. 475, 494-95 (2006) (discussing the role of
executive pay in the context of takeovers).
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A “new economy” firm is usually defined as a firm from one of the following market sectors:
computers, semiconductors, telephone equipment, or internet-related industries. See, e.g., Christopher D.
Ittner, Richard A. Lambert & David F. Larcker, The Structure and Performance of Equity Grants to
Employees of New Economy Firms, 34 J. ACC. & ECON. 89 (2003).
4
See Intel’s stated policy available at http://www.intel.com/jobs/workplace/benefits.htm (“At Intel,
our employees own a stake in the company. Through Intel's Stock Option Plan, full- and part-time
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value through convenient payroll deductions.”).
5
Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects? (Working Paper 2000)
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=361600.
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This description accurately reiterates and questions the commonly-held rationale for
option grants. Although every employee with stock options is expected to exert more
effort at work due to the options, why would anyone cause herself discomfort based on
the remote possibility that her modified behavior will substantially alter the value of the
option grant? The picture changes dramatically, however, if we instead understand the
recipient employee as a monitor and not as a target of monitoring by means of the option.
No substantial effort is required of employees to monitor their peers, as the working
interactions allow them to easily observe their fellow employees. In contrast to the
literature’s paradigm of options overcoming recipients’ natural discomfort from exerting
greater effort, peer monitoring is almost costless and requires only awareness. It is
therefore hardly surprising that most new economy firms arrange the working
environment in an open-space pattern, as open spaces and option grants are
complementary measures. Even if the employees handle especially valuable and
sensitive information, the employer has no need for sophisticated surveillance techniques,
since the employees, armed with options, are always watching their peers on the firm’s
behalf. It is hard to imagine anyone in a better position to fulfill this mission, and since
their explicit duties do not include this task, it is wise to give them an incentive to do so
in the form of options. Ironically, options cause employees in these firms to work harder,
not because (as commonly thought) they consider themselves owners but because their
peers are watching and care.
Moreover, in many new economy firms, almost any employee can cause
considerable damage to the firm by way of breach of trust or otherwise tampering with
the firm’s intellectual property. This harmful potential is usually much more significant
than any beneficial potential that one employee bears, as a rotten-minded employee can
destroy the achievements of many others. This reality underscores the usefulness of
options as a monitoring device. If an ill-minded or untrustworthy employee wishes to
harm the firm, it is unlikely that her option grant will cause her to reconsider. However,
the value of the option grants of her peer employees could drop substantially if she were,
in fact, to carry out such a scheme, which causes her peers to be alert to the possibility of
such an occurrence. When an employee becomes cause for concern, other employees
(including those usually supervised by her) will quickly report her to eliminate the danger
she poses. Altogether, the proposed view of option grants tilts both sides of the classic
equation. On the one hand, employees are required to exert almost no effort in
monitoring their peers, especially if the working environment is arranged in a transparent
manner. On the other hand, peer monitoring can prevent much damage to and leakage of
valuable information to competitors. Thus, a medium-sized option package that cannot
motivate an employee to work harder can easily motivate her to perform the task of
monitoring. As we shall see below, recent empirical studies that refute the classic view of
option grants as an incentive device correspond perfectly with the argument presented in
this paper.
A second application of this proposed approach explains why stock-based
compensation is justified for key officers in concentrated ownership enterprises. Again,
it is doubtful that these grants make any real contribution to motivating these officers to
exert greater effort. After all, in a concentrated ownership firm, in contrast to a diffused
ownership firm, the entity has a controller who can reward or sanction the officers
directly, without need for the crude measure of options. The reverse monitoring theory
3

suggests an alternative explanation. Equipped with options, key officers guard against
expropriation by the controlling shareholder of the entity, although they must do so in a
covert manner so as to prevent the controller’s revenge. Concentrated ownership firms
with this type of compensation structure should be able to more easily persuade
institutional investors that the controller will not pursue her own agenda rather than that
shared by all shareholders. This explanation sheds light on why equity-based
compensation is on the rise outside U.S. boundaries, where firm ownership is commonly
concentrated (and self-dealing by the controller is a major issue), as well as in U.S. firms
with controllers.
Finally, the discussion is relevant to the matter of gatekeepers. Equity-based
compensation for gatekeepers is an attractive measure from the reverse monitoring
perspective. However, such a measure can be tricky. While, on the one hand, it will
motivate the gatekeeper to monitor the action of management in some aspects (such as
with regard to self-dealing transactions), it may, on the other hand, also exacerbate other
problems (such as accounting fraud). Some checks and balances are, therefore,
necessary, if equity-based compensation is to be an effective mechanism for rewarding
gatekeepers.6
The paper progresses as follows. Section II starts out by discussing the
proliferation of executive and broad-based stock option plans (and other equity-based
compensation) in the U.S. Thereafter, the Section briefly discusses the main criticism
against the current trends in executive compensation and shows that it does not hold for
broad-based stock option plans. Section III discusses the non-incentive based
justifications given in the literature for this trend and the reasons why these explanations
are questionable. Section IV presents the idea of reverse monitoring and how this
approach can shed light on recent empirical findings that challenge the classic incentivebased view of equity-based compensation. Section III expands the discussion to consider
equity-based compensation to executives in public firms with a controlling shareholder,
and to gatekeepers. Equity-based compensation in partially privatized firms and in preIPO ventures are also briefly discussed. Section IV wraps up the discussion.
II. THE PROLIFERATION OF EXECUTIVE AND BROAD-BASED ESOPS IN THE U.S.
Most of the literature on employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”) centers
around executive compensation.7 Given the intriguing facts involved in these plans, this
is hardly surprising. Much has changed since Jensen and Murphy first made their famous
claim in 1990, that American CEOs are “paid like bureaucrats.”8 Between the years 1980
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For a recent discussion of rewards to gatekeepers, see Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman,
Rewarding Outside Director (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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KEVIN F. HALLOCK & KEVIN J. MURPHY, THE ECONOMICS OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (K.
Hallock & K. Murphy, eds., Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999) (reporting a surge in the number of papers
that discuss executive compensation in the 1990s).
8
Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives — It’s Not How Much You Pay, But How,
68 HARV. BUS. REV. 138 (1990) (reviewing U.S. executive compensation in the period of 1969 to 1983).
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and 1994, the average executive compensation rose by 209%,9 and between the years
1992 and 1998, it almost tripled, with average compensation to the top five executive in
the largest 500 U.S. companies climbing from $2,335,000 to $6,549,000.10 The increase
in average CEO total compensation was even more stunning, from $3,500,000 in 1992 to
$14,700,000 in 2000.11
This dramatic rise in executive compensation was due at least in part to the
striking increase in option grants. While, in 1985, the value of options granted was only
8% of the average CEO total compensation,12 in the period of 1992 to 1998, the options
value rose from 15% to 40% and,13 in 2000, peaked at 51% of the average total
compensation.14 Moreover, while, in 1980, only 57% of the top executives owned any
options in their firms, this number had risen to 87% by 1994;15 in the year 1999 alone,
94% of the largest companies granted options to their executives.16
However, and not withstanding the high-profile discussion on managerial pay,
equity-based compensation is certainly not a phenomenon related exclusively to top
executives. Although top executives do receive much of this type of compensation, the
lion’s share goes to mid-level employees. In a random sample of 1000 firms that filed
proxy statements with the SEC in 1999, no less than 48.9% had adopted broad-based
stock option plans in 1998.17 Among those firms making broad use of stock-based
9

Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?, 113 Q.J. ECON.
653, 655 (1998) (reviewing compensation practices of the 400 largest public firms and concluding that
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See Linda J. Barris, The Overcompensation Problem: A Collective Approach to Controlling
Executive Pay, 68 IND. L.J. 59, 64 (1992) (an empirical study among 800 public firms).
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See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options, 90
AM. ECON. REV. 209 (2002); Perry & Zenner, supra note 10, at 131; Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Economics,
and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713, 719 (1995) (an extensive review of executive
compensation practices among 1000 large public firms–for example, options accounted for 23% of
executive total compensation, averaging $1,300,000 per each of the top-five paid executives).
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See Murphy, supra note 10, at 848.
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See Hall & Liebman, supra note 9, at 663.
16
See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives, 33 J. ACCT.
ECON. 3, 4 (2002) (reviewing executive compensation in the largest 500 U.S. firms); see also Marcel
Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corporate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1888
(2000) (reporting that, in 1996, in a sample of 250 large public firms, 90% of the companies used stock
option compensation).
17
An ESOP was defined for the purposes of the study as broad-based if it grants all employees,
excluding the 10% most highly paid employees, at least 1% of the firm’s outstanding share capital in one
year. Since detailed information in securities disclosure is available only for the five highest-paid workers,
the above calculation entails certain assumptions. See Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms
Give Stock Options to All Employees? An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories 7 (NBER
Working Paper 2004) available at http://www.nber.org/paper/w10222 (empirical investigation of broadbased ESOPs).
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compensation, beyond the executive tier, the new economy firms from industries based
on knowledge are highly over-represented. Whereas these firms represent only 16.2% of
the entire sample in number, they account for 26.2% of the sample firms with broadbased plans and only 6.6% of firms that grant options mainly to their executives. These
significant findings – that many firms issue options to many employees and that new
economy firms do so more than other firms – present a challenge to the existing
literature, but are easily reconcilable with the reverse monitoring argument. Before we
progress to this explanation and the fact that additional empirical findings seem to
corroborate it, however, a few words are in order about current criticism of executive pay
and why it bears little relevance to our discussion.
In a recent book, which has received much attention in the media and academia,
Bebchuk and Fried argue that executive compensation in the U.S. is structured for the
benefit of managers and is inimical to shareholders.18 If this criticism is justified and it
extends to broad-based ESOPs as well, then this paper’s quest to uncover the benefits of
ESOPs to employers may well be moot. However, upon brief scrutiny, this line of
criticism is revealed to be, by and large, irrelevant to our discussion. Bebchuk and Fried
argue, in short, that top executives, especially CEOs, have considerable power to
intervene in setting compensation and therefore lead to less-than-optimal contracting
results. The result is too much pay with too low sensitivity to firm performance,
accompanied by many inefficient arrangements that provide unnoticed “stealth”
compensation to managers. The use of options and similar compensation arrangements,
goes the argument, does not really serve the purpose of motivating managers, but, rather,
is an excuse to pay more.
On its face, this line of criticism simply does not apply to broad-based ESOPs.
Mid-level employees have no special power in setting their own compensation, nor
would the firm have any incentive to compensate inefficiently. If pay structure for these
employees is inefficient, both the firm and employees can do better by improving that
pay structure. And since option grants that fluctuate in value impose considerable risk on
the recipient employees, there must be compelling justification to use them; otherwise
firms could use conventional pay, which would allow them to both pay less and impose
less risk on the workers, leaving both parties better off. Moreover, accepting Bebchuk
and Fried’s criticism on the current structure of executive pay does not entail the
conclusion that equity-based compensation is an undesirable measure. In fact, this
measure, when structured correctly, is highly recommended by the authors:
“The managerial power approach does not question the
desirability of using options to compensate executives. Options
provide managers with greater incentive to create shareholder
value, and thus the use of options in executive compensation
might well be beneficial to shareholders. Rather, the managerial
18

LUCIAN A. BEBCHUK & JESSE M. FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (Harvard University Press, 2004) (criticizing manager pay
practices and offering reform proposal). But cf. John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randell S. Thomas, Is
U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance? (Working Paper 2004) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=648648 (arguing against Bebchuk and Fried’s major
points and proposals).
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power approach focuses on whether the magnitude and design of
a particular option-based pay package are close to that which
would arise under optimal contracting.”19
As will be shown below, this means that the reverse monitoring approach
advanced by this paper is useful in understanding the desirability of options for
managerial pay as well. First, in a diffused ownership setting, my argument backs the
conventional one – i.e., options motivate the recipient manager who could not be easily
monitored otherwise. Second, in a concentrated ownership setting, where top managers
are quite easily monitored by the controlling shareholder, under my approach, the
primary effect of options is to induce top executives to monitor the firm’s controller as
well as their peers.
III. NON-INCENTIVE-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE ADOPTION OF ESOPS ON A BROAD
BASIS
We saw above that the criticism directed at executive option plans is not
applicable to option plans for ordinary employees. Moreover, the empirical literature on
the outcomes of such broad-based ESOP adoption is highly favorable to the shareholders
of the adopting firms. Firms that broadly disperse stock options to employees enjoy
better economic performance, in different measures, than their non-granting peer firms.20
Further analysis shows that option grants bear a statistically significant positive influence
on the market value of option-adopting firms.21 What benefits, then, do broad-based
ESOPs produce to counter the costs of the expensive measure? While the most common
answer is that ESOPs overcome employees’ free-riding and give them incentive to exert
additional efforts at work, this paper argues that this incentive is not likely to emerge in
practice and that the answer to the question therefore lies in another type of incentive that
stock option generate. But before discussing the flaws of the common incentive-based
argument and my proposed alternative, this section of the paper will consider other, nonincentive-based justifications for stock option plans. I briefly present each justification
and discuss certain reservations that can be raised with regard to these justifications,
although this paper’s argument can in fact complement each of the justifications.
1. RETENTION
A commonly echoed argument in the literature is that options are “golden
handcuffs,” assisting firms to preserve their workforce and prevent attrition. Options
undoubtedly do have this quality, as they usually vest gradually, normally along a four19

Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction
in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751, 792 (2002).
20
See, e.g., J. Sesil, M. Kranmova, D. Kruse & J. Blasi, Broad-Based Employee Stock Options in
U.S. New Economy Firms, 40 British J. Industrial Relations 273 (2002) (measuring differences in financial
outcomes for firms with and without broad-based ESOPs); Ittner et al., supra note 3 (measuring success of
ESOPs against firm’s stated objective).
21
Timothy B. Bell, Wayne.R. Landsman, Bruce.L. Miller & Shu Yeh, The Valuation Implications of
Employee Stock Option: Accounting for Profitable Computer Software Firms, 77 Accounting Rev. 971
(2002).
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year period, which makes it worthwhile for workers to maintain their positions at the
firm. However, this argument per se does not explain the superiority of options over
other forms of long-term compensation. Option grants involve risks, including factors
beyond the firm’s boundaries and control; thus, if retention is the firm’s only concern, a
fixed long-term bonus plan (or one that is tied to individual employee performance)
seems more suitable. The prevalent retention argument, therefore, does not explain why
option grants, as a specific type of differed compensation, are the best suited tool for
employee retention.
However, there is a more sophisticated version of the employee retention
argument. Stock prices in an industry and its labor market conditions are often
correlated. When stock prices soar in an industry, employers are typically short of
workers, and vice versa. Long-term option grants automatically index employees’
deferred compensation value to their outside employment opportunities. Costly
negotiations and adjustments of contracts are therefore saved by the fact that the inflated
value of the option grant prevents attrition when conditions for employees improve in the
market. Interestingly, this sophisticated version of the employee retention justification
has some empirical backing. The authors of one study showed that fluctuations in
salaries in certain markets are accompanied by correlating fluctuations in the value of
mid-sized option grants in the same markets, thus saving the burden and cost of adjusting
wages.22
While I have no doubt that a compensation package containing options assists in
employee retention, I think that to argue that this is the objective of granting options is to
miss the point. Although the value of options is influenced by macro-economics and
industry-wide factors, a distinct feature of options is that they first and foremost reflect
the performance of the issuing firm. If the main concern of employers were indexing
compensation to outside employment opportunities, salaries could be indexed to industrylevel indicators. Therefore, for a full picture of the rationale for the extensive use of
options in the market, a theory directly connecting between the employee and the issueremployer is necessary.
2. FINANCING CONSTRAINTS
Another common explanation for using ESOPs extensively examined in the
literature maintains that cash-constrained firms offer stock as compensation in lieu of
raising funds in a more traditional fashion. While this argument is intuitively very
compelling, its empirical backing is only partial. One study, seeking empirical support
for this argument, looked for a link between ESOP usage and a few different measures of
financial constraint. The study revealed that firms that grant options have more
accumulated losses, but it could not find any correlation between option grants and other
measures, such as dividend payouts.23 Other studies showed findings that were even less
favorable to the financial constraints explanation. One study looked for a link between
ESOP usage and cash-flows per employee or available-cash-per-employee as measures of
22

Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 17, at 28-32.
Simi Kedia & Abon Mozumdar, Performance Impact of Employee Stock Options (Working Paper
2002) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=304188.
23
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financial constraints in new economy firms and concluded that there is “no evidence that
cash constrained new economy firms make greater use of equity-based compensation.”24
This finding is especially problematic for the financial constraints argument since the
intuition is that many new economy start-ups issue ESOPs in lieu of paying salaries
because they are cash constrained. Finally, in relation to non-executive grants, which are
especially interesting for the reverse monitoring argument, one study found that they are
positively related to high cash levels and unrelated to several factors of cash constraints
and financial distress. This study concluded that “these findings contradict the notion
that option compensation is used to alleviate financing constraints.”25
But putting aside the empirical findings, it is common knowledge that
heavyweight new economy firms such as Intel, Microsoft, IBM, Dell, and many others
use stock-based compensation extensively, to say the least. Therefore, even if there is
much appeal and sense to the financial constraints justification, it surely does not tell the
entire story of employee stock options.
3. SORTING
The next explanation for broad-based employee stock ownership plans is the
sorting argument, namely, that firms are able to sort out the most suitable employees by
means of incentive pay packages. Traditional sorting arguments suggest that firms offer
incentive packages to attract the employees who can best contribute to firm value.26 In its
simple form, however, this type of argument assumes that a single able employee can
improve the firm market value to such a degree that it is even worthwhile to design a
compensation scheme that involves much uncertainty from the point of view of the
employee (and therefore expensive to the employer who has to compensate the employee
for the risk).27 Since the validity of this assumption is questionable, as I will elaborate in
my discussion of incentives considerations, researchers have formulated and tested more
nuanced sorting arguments.28
Under the more sophisticated models of sorting, employees are heterogeneous in
their beliefs regarding the firm's prospects. Hence, the corporation will attract the most
optimistic employees by offering stock compensation. The firm can benefit from this
practice because it enables the firm to reduce its overall compensation expenses. If
"optimistic" employees value the firm's stock options above the market price, then firms
may pay less by offering them stock, as opposed to traditional pay packages. This
argument does not entail the assumption that each sorted employee believes that she
alone can significantly drive up the market value of the firm's shares. Rather, it is
necessary only for some employees to believe in the specific prospects of the employer
24

Ittner et al., supra note 3, at 108.
Nittai Bergman & Dirk Jenter, Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation (Working
Paper 2005) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=587426.
26
See, Edward P. Lazear, "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?" (April 2003). IZA
Discussion Paper No. 761. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=403900 (a model in which firms cannot
distinguish between the types of work applicants and therefore attract employees who can contribute the
most by tying the offered pay to the employee's performance).
27
The risk stems from the volatility of the share prices on the stock exchange, which for a risk
averse employee can easily outweigh any sorting benefit asserted under the traditional argument discussed
in the text.
28
See, Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 17at 11, 24.
25
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beyond the general belief prevalent in the market place. Moreover, if we make the
additional assumption that the most optimistic employees are also the most suitable
employees, given their believe in the future of the firm, then additional benefits to the
firm ensue from hiring able employees. Thus, stock-based compensation, under this
sorting argument, enables firms to attract employees who are highly enthusiastic about
the firm's future and by offering them a pay package that falls below its cash equivalent
on the stock market.
The researchers who formulated this argument tested its plausibility against
current statistics. The main problem with this argument is the heavy risk costs associated
with stock-based compensation. Risk-averse employees discount the value of their pay
package due to the volatility of share prices on the stock exchange, which may outweigh
the benefits mentioned above. After assessing the possible effects and running a
computerized simulation, the authors tried to match the sorting argument with the
existing data and concluded as follows:
"Our calculations here indicate that, holding the employee's risk
aversion constant, firms with lower stock volatility can more efficiently
use stock options. Firms in the NCEO sample tend, however, to have
very high volatilities. The fact that high-volatility firms use options is
consistent with sorting only if these firms hire a selection of very risk
tolerant employees, if the firm can locate extremely optimistic
employees, or if optimistic employees are significantly more
productive."29

As expressed in the above passage, the finding that the most volatile firms are
those that use stock-based compensation does leave some room for the sorting hypothesis
but it also requires adding highly restrictive assumptions. At the very least, these
qualification raise doubts whether firms can afford to design compensation schemes that
are effective only for highly-optimistic and risk-tolerant employees. Moreover, the
authors did not explain why less volatile firms that could utilize the same compensation
scheme efficiently do not use it as often. Most importantly, and on the theoretical level,
attracting optimistic employees by granting them overvalued shares seems, to me, an
adverse practice. Indeed, although, at the time of the options grant, some compensation
costs are minimized, when stock options vest and the employees eventually reveal their
over-optimism, the firm has to cope with its highly disappointed employees. Since a firm
must maintain a good relationship with its workforce over time, I doubt the wisdom of
attracting employees by taking advantage of their optimism. Hence, even if firms could
under-pay by using subjectively overvalued equity, it does not follow that this practice is
desirable, nor is it proven that the objective value of stock or an options grant to
employees in practice falls short of its cash equivalent. Thus, if stock ownership plans
sort optimistic employees and thus economize on some compensation costs, it seems to
me that this is a by-product of these remuneration measures and not their main aim or
consequences.

29

Id., at 27.
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4. ACCOUNTING CONSIDERATIONS
Until recently, employee stock option plans received favorable accounting
treatment. Firms could generally elect not to recognize pay in stock options as an
expense, although the value of the stock option grant had to be disclosed to the public.30
Thus, firms were able to boost their profits by using options instead of plain vanilla
salaries. However, if the stock market considers the entire disclosure and not only the
financial statements, share prices should not be affected by the artificially inflated profits.
Interestingly, there are some empirical findings that "call into question whether investors
assess correctly the effect of [employee stock options] on … firm value,"31 and at the
very least, it is unclear precisely how stock prices incorporate option grant information.32
Hence, if investors can be tricked to some extent by evading recognition of the expense
of stock options, the accounting treatment may be a cause of the expansion in stockoption pay. Moreover, this favorable accounting treatment might be a contributing factor
in the stock-option trend even if managers naively believe that the market can be fooled
or if their own pay is linked to the firm's accounting performance and not to the market
value of the shares.
However, it is doubtful whether favorable accounting treatment can explain the
prevalence of stock-based compensation. Given that employees tend to be risk averse,
compensating them with stock-based pay whose value depends on the uncertain
movement of the market is a very expensive measure.33 If the entire maneuver is aimed
at artificially inflating profits and camouflaging expenses, then at least firms with solid
corporate governance are not expected to pay more in options to compensate for the risk
involved from the employees' perspective. However, empirical research reveals that
corporate governance is not weaker among the types of firms that tend to issue more
options relative to the type of firm that uses option-based pay to a lesser extent.34 This
finding calls into doubt the favorable accounting treatment argument. Along the same
lines, many firms that use broad-based option plans, such as Microsoft and Oracle, are
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31
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managed by founders with large equity stakes, and they are unlikely to harm firm value in
exchange for an artificial increase in profits.35
Moreover, by early 2003, more than 200 companies that use stock-based
compensation had voluntarily begun to include options as an expense, thus forgoing the
favorable accounting treatment.36 But most importantly, new financial accounting
standards now mandate recognizing option-based pay as an expense.37 The favorable
accounting treatment is now history. If this accounting treatment did play a role in the
emergence of the stock-option trend, it can no longer justify its existence, and although
firms are reconsidering the use of stock-based compensation there is no sign that this
phenomenon is close to disappearing.
5. MORALE, TEAMWORK, AND NORMS
The next possible explanation for the popularity of broad-based employee stock
ownership plans focuses on the effect this type of compensation has on the norms and
morale of the firm workforce. Under this argument, stock or stock-option grants change
the status of the employee from an ordinary worker to an owner and transforms the firm's
workforce into a community. Once workers become owners, they develop social norms
that entail that they cooperate with other members of their community and devote as
much effort as possible to the community's prosperity. This may also explain why all
workers should be rewarded, although not necessarily to the same extent, so that no one
feels left out of the community. In fact, this ideal is the same model often manifested by
the employers themselves. In the words of Microsoft CEO Steve Balmer, "Our
compensation philosophy is simple … . We want to attract and retain employees by
offering real ownership and great long-term financial incentives."38
The phrase "real ownership" conceals the fact that the fraction of ownership
granted to the individual employee is minute. But, just as people do not calculate their
fraction of ownership in their household nor in their narrow community, employees are
expected to do their utmost for their corporation once options are introduced even if their
financial benefit from this behavior is miniscule. The norms generated by the stockoption compensation measure are thus supposed to overcome the firm's necessity to
monitor the recipient employees.
While I doubt how much water this argument holds, I will nonetheless detail
another impact stock-based compensation has on social norms and human behavior that
has evaded the literature. Namely, stock-based compensation has an interesting role in
inducing employees to monitor their peers from the aspect of social norms and irrational
35
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behavior. This stands in contradiction to the traditional view that stresses the role of such
compensation in inducing investment of effort and maintaining cooperation. To
appreciate my monitoring argument, it is necessary to first understand that in the absence
of stock-based compensation, the work environment is tainted by certain cognitive biases
identified by behavioral economy39 and by certain flaws identified by organizational
psychology. So as not to stray from the scope of this essay, I will only briefly sketch a
few of these biases and flaws and will then explain how stock-based compensation assists
the corporation in partially overcoming the challenges that stem from them.
The first phenomenon, documented in a seminal experiment by Asch, is
conformism.40 Simply put, people tend to heed the consensus and put aside their own
beliefs, moral opinions, and even good judgment. Conformism can be dangerous if a
firm's workforce adopts detrimental trends such as treating customers poorly or stealing
from the employer. A second, well-documented phenomenon in organizational
psychology is workers' obedience to what they perceive to be a legitimate authority
within the organization. The potential harm in such a tendency lies in the fact that
employees rarely try to contradict their supervisors, even if a supervisor's behavior is
harmful to the firm and its shareholders. Third, and as experiments in behavioral
economics have shown, people are often irrational in that they have a so-called selfprotective or self-serving bias.41 This bias allows them to overlook flaws in their own
behavior or the environment and believe that their acts are moral and good for all parties
involved. In the workplace, this bias allows workers to bury their heads in the sand and
ignore almost any misbehavior carried out by their colleagues and managers, since
confrontation always comes at a personal cost.
Finally, three additional pervasive cognitive biases are particularly relevant: the
status quo bias, the availability bias, and the anchorage bias. All three biases are grave
impediments to any employee-monitoring endeavor. The meaning of the status quo bias
is that people tend to preserve the current state of affairs,42 and in the workplace, if that
39
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state warrants modification, employees will barely notice this fact or else will not seek to
effect any change. The availability and anchorage biases refer to the fact that available
and accessible information and events make lasting over-rated impressions43 and that
people hang on to information given to them even when there is no evidence of its
credibility.44 Since workers are introduced to existing practices and facts by their
supervisors and peers, these two biases make it harder for employees to criticize their
colleagues and doubt their statements.
In the absence of incentive pay, these biases and human characteristics work in
concert against the possibility of peer monitoring. The natural tendency is to avoid
conflict, accept the current state of affairs and any weak explanation that may support it,
and overlook problematic occurrences and behaviors. Stock-based compensation releases
certain forces that mitigate these problems. Any harmful acts that hurt the shareholders
also hurt the recipient employee. The employee can hardly remain indifferent to such
harm, for this is no longer a self-serving strategy. As norms of conformity conflict with
norms of preventing harm to oneself, the employee becomes embittered and, in some
cases, will report or otherwise act against the perpetrators of the harm to the firm.
6. TAX CONSIDERATIONS
Undeniably, tax considerations are critical in understanding the surge in use of
stock-based compensation, particularly stock–option plans. One such consideration, in
brief, is that tax deferrals are allowed for so-called "nonqualified" options and both tax
deferrals and improved tax rates for the employee are available for so-called "qualified"
options.45 A second tax consideration, relevant only for top management, is that, under
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, compensation beyond $1 million paid to
executives named in the company's proxy statement (usually the five highest-paid
managers) cannot be deducted as an expense for tax purposes.46 However, section
43
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162(m) exempts "performance-based" compensation from this burdensome limitation,
which ultimately contributes to the attractiveness of using options.
The inevitable conclusion of this brief discussion is that taxation considerations
are a major factor in the development and use of stock-based compensation.47 However,
this explanation does not render the rest of the discussion redundant, for two chief
reasons, the first from a normative perspective and the second at the descriptive level.
First, as manifested in the abovementioned section 162(m) exemption, Congress
intentionally drafted tax breaks to encourage "performance-based" compensation. It is
therefore important to question whether stock-based compensation should be encouraged
and, particularly, which incentives, if at all, this compensation method creates. Second, it
is important to recognize the huge waste involved in this type of compensation to
understand that the tax benefits offered, no matter how substantial, cannot be the sole
reason for the popularity of stock-based compensation.
Employees are typically risk-averse. The value of stock-based compensation is
highly contingent on risk factors and uncertainties that are way beyond the control of the
recipient employees, and risk-averse employees therefore discount the value of stockbased compensation. Firms could substitute this type of compensation with a much lower
payment in cash that does not entail uncertainty. The difference between the two
alternatives is the cost, or the waste, involved in stock-based compensation. Several
leading economists have tried to quantify this cost, concluding that, operating under
reasonable assumptions about risk aversion and diversification, employees value options
(with ordinary features) at "only about half of their cost to the firm."48 This astounding
gap cannot be overcome solely by any tax benefit, rendering pertinent the inquiry in the
next section into the motivational benefits arising from stock-based compensation.
IV. REVERSE MONITORING: A NEW VIEW OF ESOPS AS AN INCENTIVE MECHANISM
1. On Two Versions of Agency Theory Explanations
A recent article entitled Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive
Effects?49 exemplifies the puzzle of mid-level employee incentive pay. As will be shown
below, mid-level employees receive modest option grants in comparison to executives,
and their efforts for the firm’s benefit have negligible impact on the firm’s market value
relative to the effect of the efforts made by the CEO and a small group of top executives.
This reality has led researchers to argue that the common agency theory understanding of
incentive pay does not hold in this context, driving them to search for explanations
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beyond the scope of agency theory.50 The principal point of this paper, however, is that
agency theory can in fact supply a good explanation for the prevalence of employee
ownership plans, although not the one usually advanced in the literature. To elucidate the
difference between the two arguments stemming from agency theory, it is important to
briefly review the fundamental features of the theory.51
Under agency theory, whenever one person, the agent (in our case, an employee),
is required to fulfill a task for another person, the principal (in our case, the employer), a
conflict of interest emerges. This conflict means that the agent may pursue her own
agenda rather than actions that are optimal in fulfilling her task for the principal. As a
result, goes the argument, the principal-agent setting entails three types of costs. The first
type is monitoring costs. Since the agent is prone to deviate from the goals set for her,
the principal must employ expensive means to verify what her agent is doing and, if
necessary, to call her to order. Hence, business owners review the accounts to prevent
deviances; restaurant owners use covert inspectors to verify the level of service; owners
of diamond mines check the clothes of miners at the end of the day to prevent theft.
These types of efforts and expenses are termed monitoring costs.
The second inevitable type of cost is bonding costs. Bonding measures do not
assist the principal in scrutinizing and governing the actions of the agent, but, rather, are
intended to ensure that the agent sticks to the objectives of her employment. Hence, a
public servant is often required to cut any ties he may have with the business community
to ensure objectivity; financial reporters or advisors are required to refrain from personal
investments to prevent skewed recommendations; and workers go to much trouble to
bring references and pursue studies, which, at least in part, are efforts aimed at showing
how devoted they are going to be to their jobs.
Finally, even after monitoring and bonding costs, there is a residual loss to be
borne. This means that there is always enough room for a conflict of interest to arise
between the principal and agent. For example, a certain amount of theft by workers
always occurs, some confidential information will always leak, and employee effort
levels rarely meet those of owners. In fact, as long as the residual losses are lower than
the cost of additional bonding or monitoring costs required to overcome them, it is
efficient to incur these losses.
Into this normative setting enters the traditional account of incentive pay. Since
any worker is an agent and therefore presents a risk of misbehavior, theft, disgorgement
of confidential information, and, most often, simple laziness, agency theory calls upon
the parties to design the employment agreement accordingly. Specifically, under agency
theory, compensation should be structured to overcome these problems. If the employee
can hope to receive a part of the gains accrued by the employer from optimal service,
then the agency problem can be alleviated. Linking pay to performance of the
employer’s stock on the stock exchange, for example, by granting options, goes the
argument, may achieve this desired goal.
50
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However, option grants are undeniably a highly expensive method of
compensation. The main reason is that employees, like most people, are risk-averse.
Since the value of option grants easily fluctuates due to factors beyond the employee’s
control, options are an extremely risky asset from her perspective. Moreover, employees
are tied with their human capital to the firm, and putting much of their personal wealth in
options means putting all their eggs into one basket and further increasing their risk.
Taken together, the risk-bearing factor causes employees to accept much lower
compensation in cash instead of an option grant with an equivalent market value.
Therefore, payment with options, which employees value less, is expensive currency for
firms.52 Furthermore, since no one can go to the grocery with options, they cannot replace
the employee’s entire salary. Therefore, options usually supplement—at least in part—
regular salary, thereby further increasing the cost of options to the firm and its
shareholders.53
The incentives that options create must overcome these costs to make option
grants worthwhile. Note, though, that, under the traditional argument, option grants are
not intended to allow the principal to watch and govern the agent’s actions, and therefore
they cannot be accounted for as monitoring costs. On the contrary, their role is to induce
employees to exert effort even when the employer is not watching. To some extent, this
argument even assumes that employee efforts are non-verifiable from the point of view of
the employer. In agency theory terms, therefore, the proper specification of the costs that
options entail is bonding costs. The employee accepts options, even though she would
prefer the equivalent in cash, in order to commit to the objectives of the shareholders.
The problem with this argument is that it cannot stand up to any test of reality, at least in
the context of the actual compensation plans of most workers.
A recent study shows that a typical firm grants options with a value equal to oneyear’s salary to middle managers and that these managers own a very small fraction of
the firm (less than one-one-thousandth of a percent in the case of the larger firms).54
Careful econometric analysis shows that using options to motivate managers to exert
efforts under these circumstances is, therefore, ludicrous and, in the words of the authors,
“Given our calculations here, we find it very difficult to believe that stock options could
be the most efficient incentive mechanism available to firms.”55 To exemplify, consider
an engineer who receives an option grant of $100,000 in a firm with a market value of
$10 billion. To increase the value of her fractional holdings by just 1% (equivalent to
$1000), she needs to increase the firm’s market value by $100 million. It is doubtful that
any effort on her part could achieve this goal, especially an effort that is valued at less
than $1000 from her perspective. Recall also the waste related to risk-bearing on which
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we have elaborated earlier in our discussion.56 Many managers would be willing to
exchange options worth $100,000 for half the amount in cash.57 Under these
circumstances, it seems unrealistic to surmise that the firm cannot come up with a better
mechanism to ensure optimal effort on the part of its employees.
While exerting efforts to perform better seems a remote rationale for the use of
stock options, the empirical research still finds a (remotely) plausible incentive effect for
options, as follows:
“The most favorable case that can be made for options-as-incentives is
this: options are sensible for incentive purposes under a very limited
set of circumstances – namely, if employees take actions that have
large value implications for the firm, the costs to the employee of
taking these actions are very small, and it is extremely difficult for
firms to observe whether employees are taking these actions.”58
This allegedly hypothetical and remote case for an incentive-based justification
for options is precisely the case of reverse monitoring. One should not think of options,
especially those granted to mid-level employees, as a method of encouraging recipient
employees to work harder, but rather as an incentive to watch other workers and
constituencies of the entity. Put differently, the costs of options borne by the firm are
monitoring costs, not bonding costs. Armed with options, employees will ensure that
others do not harm the firm. Note that all three requirements of the empirical study are
fulfilled here. First, no special effort is needed beyond paying attention, as employees are
natural monitors of their peers. While outside agents need to penetrate the organization
and use surveillance techniques or indirect monitoring methods, the employees are
already there, performing their day-to-day tasks. The employer can arrange the work
force and the work tasks to enhance the ease of monitoring. For instance, working in
groups and dividing up one task among several groups to require interaction, the reality
in many high-tech firms, is one means of doing this. The physical structure of the work
environment is another method, as open space and any other arrangement that increases
transparency allow for easy monitoring. In many new economy firms, an employee
cannot make a phone call or perform a task on her computer screen without other
employees inadvertently noticing. In these places, options are commonly believed to
motivate employees to work harder because of the options they received, but it actually
make more sense that they work harder because their peers have received options and are
watching them closely.
Second, while the efforts exerted by a single mid-level employee cannot
contribute much to improving the market value of a large firm, the employee can still
significantly harm the firm, especially in the knowledge industry. In an interview with a
mid-level manager at Intel, the manager estimated that each engineer in his group could
easily harm Intel significantly by releasing certain information to a competitor.59 Intel,
with its multi-billion-dollar market value, is particularly vulnerable to such leaks due to
56
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the nature of its assets. While one lone engineer cannot reasonably improve the market
value significantly, the potential damage that the individual worker can wreak to this
value is enormous. Investing in monitoring is, therefore, crucial, and the more vulnerable
a firm, the more options it is likely to issue to its employees. It is hard to find an
effective alternative to so many good and intelligent monitors already positioned within
the facility. Monitoring by employees is, thus, both non-substitutable and likely to
prevent much harm, thus fulfilling two additional requirements for effective use of
options laid out in the empirical literature.
2. Additional Empirical Verification
The findings of additional recent empirical studies of broad-based employee
ownership plans seem to comply with the predictions of this theory and fail to conform to
the classic incentive-based explanation. The one paper compares executive option grants
to non-executive option plans, following a sample of 1170 firms through the years 19962001.60 Similar to the results of previous studies, the authors of this study found that topfive executives receive a disproportionate share of the total grants (20%) and that ESOPs
tend to increase both the firm’s valuation and net income.61 The study’s unprecedented
finding was that, in the regressions, the non-executive portion of the grant had a more
pronounced and positive effect on both net income and firm valuation.62 Given this
finding, the authors took for granted the traditional account of options as an incentive
mechanism and made the following statement:
“On the surface it may seem surprising that the effect of options appears
to be smaller for executives than for lower-level employees since, from a
risk/incentive perspective, it seems likely that executives have more
control over firm performance and may be less risk averse”63
Thus, the authors implicitly consider option recipients to be those who should be
encouraged to exert additional costly effort, and they therefore logically assume that
broad-based plans entail waste. Since lower-level employee efforts can barely affect a
firm’s market value, the authors were surprised to find that broad-based plans increase
firm performance and market value more than executive-only plans do.64 However,
under the reverse monitoring argument, even the slightest incentives can suffice to induce
one employee to monitor her peers, since no extraordinary efforts are necessary on her
part to do so. This is especially true in firms and industries in which a lack of careful
monitoring at all levels of the organization can lead to much damage. These firms reveal
themselves as such by adopting broad-based ESOPs, and it therefore comes as no surprise
60
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that these measures increase their performance and valuation. Most significantly, the
ancillary findings of this empirical paper support this notion and the entire reasoning of
the reverse monitoring argument. These findings, which the authors did not deem of
particular importance, are summarized in the paper as follows:
“A larger proportion of options tend to go to lower-level employees for
firms that are larger, have more employees, spend more on research and
development and have higher market-to-book ratios.”65
All four features in this finding conform to the prediction of the reverse
monitoring argument. First, larger firms and firms with more employees not only issue
more options to low-level employees, but do so in higher proportions than other firms
relative to their size and employee base. Under the traditional incentive-based
explanation of options, this finding should be puzzling. Large firm size makes it harder
for the individual employee to improve firm value through her efforts; a sizable
workforce at a firm creates free-riding in the sense that one employee’s inexertion of
effort can be easily overcome by the efforts of others. However, it is precisely these two
characteristics that make monitoring employees in such firms by management difficult.
Hence, management must expend more resources on monitoring by peer employees,
which is the result of a high proportion of stock grants to non-executives. It is harder for
options to cause employees to exert additional effort in larger firms and firms with a
larger workforce; thus, it is much more important to motivate these workers to watch one
another. And since options can barely serve to directly motivate a mid-level employee to
increase her effort level, the latter monitoring effect is crucial.
Second, options to lower-level employees are more common in firms with higher
market-to-book ratios. Firms with high market-to-book ratios are often those firms with
high levels of intellectual property, since intellectual property developed within the firm
boundaries does not appear in the financial statement (and, hence, has no effect on the
firm’s “book” value). And since intellectual property is especially vulnerable to leakage
and tampering, its existence poses a risk of an adverse material effect on the firm’s
market value. Consequently, using options to induce peer monitoring is especially suited
to protect the market value of the firm that holds much of this property.
Finally, and related to the previous point, firms that spend more on research and
development issue a larger proportion of the option plans to lower-level employees. In
the conventional wisdom, this finding makes sense since workers in such firms are
believed to be highly creative and significant to firm value. However, at the individual
level, this argument is questionable, as one worker’s efforts, creative as they may be, can
hardly make much of a difference, at least in most cases and most of the time.
Nevertheless, firms with high R&D levels are usually new economy firms—firms in the
knowledge industries. Such knowledge can be well protected by peer employees
encouraged to monitor through option grants.
A second recent empirical study provides additional reinforcement of the reverse
monitoring view and explicitly contradicts the traditional incentive-based argument. The
authors set forth the mission of their paper as follows:
65
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“There is, however, a small but growing body of empirical literature that
provides evidence that firms that broadly disperse stock options have greater
performance … . Do certain contextual factors (e.g., firm size, industry,
technology) influence the relationship between broad-based stock options
and performance? In this paper, we focus on one such contextual factor,
firm size. We chose firm size because according to existing theory, group
incentives such as stock options are expected to be effective at monitoring
employees only in small firms.”66
This entire mission is, of course, rooted in the traditional understanding of options
as providing incentives to work harder and the view of the recipient employee as the
entity that should be monitored. The authors explain the expected negative relationship
between size and firm efficacy on two levels:67 First, as explained above, the larger the
firm, the less influential each employee is on the firm’s total output, and therefore
motivating her with options that rely on that total output is less feasible. Second, and
more interesting, greater firm size makes it harder to motivate employees even under a
much richer perception of the firm. Since interaction between employees is recurrent,
they may cooperate with one another and refrain from free-riding and thus achieve an
optimal outcome for everyone, even if each employee’s compensation is keyed to the
total output.68 This argument is often used in the context of group incentives and profitsharing because the harder everyone works, the greater the profits to be shared for the
benefit of everyone. However, even with this deeper perception of the firm and incentive
structure, large firm size is likely to be a hindrance to option efficacy. The larger the
firm, the harder it is for cooperation to emerge, thereby endangering the joint
commitment to work harder in order to maximize total output and, in turn, each worker’s
compensation.
Given these two effects of size, the authors expected to find that the benefits of
options to the issuing firm would decline with firm size (less than 500 workers, between
500-5000 workers, and over 5000 workers). They therefore gathered data on 312 firms
that had adopted broad-based option plans, divided them into three groups based on size,
and matched up each size-group with a corresponding sample of non-adopting firms. The
study followed the firms throughout the years 1995-1997, measuring multiple aspects of
firm performance (profit margins, shareholder return, labor productivity, and return on
assets).69 This study covered almost 1,200,000 employees who received options, out of
about 10 million ESOP recipients in the entire U.S. economy.70
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The authors were surprised to find that option-adopting firms outperformed their
non-adopting peers in each size category and not only in the small size category.71
Moreover, when they compared among adopting firms, the larger firms were found to
outperform the smaller ones.72 These unanticipated findings led the authors to conclude
without satisfaction that “we find strong evidence that stock option firms perform better
than the non-stock option firms, however, we do not find strong evidence that small stock
option firms perform better than stock option large firms”73 and, consequently, call for
more research on the topic.
Once again, from the perspective of the reverse monitoring explanation, these
findings come as no surprise. A large workforce sometimes prevents efficient monitoring
by means of the traditional employment hierarchy. Granting options to many employees
will cause them to monitor one another, a task that they can easily perform. If employees
work any harder in these circumstances, it is not because their options have motivated
them to do so, but, rather, because their peers are watching closely. Moreover, firm size
in terms of number of employees often reflects firm maturity. A seasoned firm, with
seasoned technology, may need to use options to protect this technology. If technology is
both a vulnerable and critical asset for the organization, option recipients will be alert in
protecting against third-party infringement.
V. Concluding Remarks
Empirical data show that options cause firms to flourish. Intuition tells us that
they motivate employees to work harder in order to improve firm value and, in turn, the
value of their grants. But if this argument does not hold, since the average correlation
between individual employee effort and total firm value is slim, then the intuition is that
employees with options work harder because they “feel” like owners and therefore care
more about the firm. This paper suggests an alternative view of options, where options
are more of a stick than a carrot. Undoubtedly, options cause employees to exert
additional effort themselves and cooperate, but, it is my claim, this stems from the fact
that options cause the individual employee to care about the acts and whereabouts of her
peers. While substantial additional efforts cannot be motivated by slim financial
incentives, monitoring others merely requires awareness and attention. As I have showed
in this paper, this new understanding can shed light on recent empirical findings and
provide explanations to puzzles such as the extensive use of options in new economy
firms and option grants to top executives in concentrated-ownership firms.
Since the tiny fraction of ownership that the average employee receives does not
turn gigantic firms into Greek democracies or mutual societies, I also question the
psychological explanation of options as fostering a sense of ownership in employees.
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Options are a monetary compensation; they are not flowers or gifts for the holidays that
employers distribute to show that they care and to raise morale. Therefore, it is important
to carefully analyze why options bring about effective results as a monetary incentive.
People in close-knit communities, such as family units, cooperate with one another due to
a sense of belonging and genuine and sincere caring, but it is doubtful that financial
incentives cultivate such altruistic behavior. I therefore argue that options promote
cooperation and industriousness because there is no way to get away with exerting lessthan-maximum effort when your peers are watching and considering the effects of your
behavior on their options. Accordingly, any misconduct may result in informal sanctions,
singling out, and, in some cases, even reporting to supervisors. Moreover, arranging the
workplace in a way that allows for transparency of employee efforts—so prevalent in
many of the firms that use options—is not aimed at generating a friendly work
atmosphere for employees, but, rather, at reinforcing peer monitoring and thus
supplements the use of options.
Before concluding, it is important to explain that this theory is not a conspiracy
theory. CEOs do not devise ESOPs with the intention of causing their employees to spy
on one another. CEOs do, however, find out, either by hunch or by observation, that
options stimulate labor to work harder and perform better. CEOs then choose to tell
themselves and their subordinates a pleasant story, in which options cause workers to
exert additional effort since they wish to improve firm value—or, alternatively, that
options simply motivate employees since employees are proud to be part of an entity that
regards them as owners. The perhaps more convincing story, the one in which employees
work harder because options turn their friends into monitors, is less convenient and
therefore silenced or never surfaces.
Finally, this essay discussed the concept of reverse monitoring in the context of
broad-based stock ownership plans and shed light on the puzzles that surround it. The
reverse monitoring view of stock-based compensation concentrates on the role of the
recipient of incentive pay as a monitor of other firm employees, including supervisors, in
contrast to the traditional view of the recipient as the entity that should be monitored.
This concept has many more applications that could not be delved into here at length.
For one, reverse monitoring can explain the rise in stock-based compensation for
executives in firms located outside of the U.S., which typically have concentrated
ownership.74 The common story of stock-based compensation for U.S. executives of
U.S. firms explains that U.S firms often have dispersed ownership.75 The dispersed
shareholders cannot effectively perform the role of monitor, and thus the monitoring gap
is filled by stock options and the like, which align manager and shareholder incentives.
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This story, however, does not fit most economies outside the U.S., where public
firms have concentrated ownership and, accordingly, usually a controlling shareholder. 76
A controlling shareholder, unlike a dispersed shareholders' body, has both the incentives
and the means to monitor and discipline managers. Why then, is stock-based
compensation, a costly mechanism, so common today in such firms as well? The reverse
monitoring concept suggests that executive stock compensation in these firms is meant to
induce managers to monitor their supervisors. Equipped with options, these officers stand
on guard against any misbehavior on the part of their own monitor—the controlling
shareholder of the entity. A controlling shareholder sometimes has a perverse incentive to
pursue her own goals at the expense of the minority, most significantly in the context of
self-dealing transactions, which are not always beneficial to the firm.77 This can result in
a drop in the firm's share prices and harm to executives with substantial stock holdings.
Such executives possess the knowledge as to whether a specific self-dealing transaction is
good or bad for the firm, and their direct contact with independent directors and
institutional shareholders may allow them to covertly block exploitative transactions.78 In
turn, when institutional investors examine self-dealing transactions in firms with stockbased compensation, investors should be easily persuaded by the controlling shareholder
that she is not pursuing her own agenda, rather than the common interests of all
shareholders. This means that controlling shareholders can commit to act for the firm by
granting stock-based compensation to their executives. To conclude, in this setting,
reverse monitoring explains that executive stock compensation can work to alleviate the
agency problem between the controlling shareholder and the minority and not only
between management and a dispersed shareholders body.
Another important application of the reverse monitoring approach comes into play
in the area of gatekeepers, such as outside directors, investment bankers, or outside legal
counsels.79 A recent paper, concentrating on the role of outside directors as gatekeepers,
suggests rewarding gatekeepers with cash grants when they expose corporate
misbehavior and in particular accounting fraud.80 The authors of the paper reject the idea
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of equity compensation to gatekeepers since, in cases of accounting fraud, stock-based
compensation can actually cause them to turn a blind eye to the fraud that drives shareprices up; moreover, in endgame scenarios, as in the Enron case, stock-based
compensation does not provide any incentive, since in bankruptcy stock compensation is
generally worth nothing.81 While these concerns carry great weight, they do not justify
ruling out stock-based compensation for gatekeepers. First, there are instances of
corporate misconduct, such as self-dealing by management, that, unlike accounting fraud,
do not inflate the value of the firm's stock and therefore do not create any perverse
incentives for the gatekeeper who is compensated with stock. Second, if stock-based
compensation is designed properly—namely, with a sufficiently long horizon and a
disgorgement of past profits that are based on fraud from the gatekeepers’ stock-based
compensation 82—gatekeepers will have incentive to fight accounting fraud as well (even
in endgame scenarios), which never enhance the value of the firm in the long-run. These
two adjustments to gatekeepers' stock-based compensation may overcome the concerns
raised in the literature and preserve the advantage of stock-based compensation over cash
grants. This advantage lies in the fact that stock compensation is automatic and finetuned. This means that, armed with stock compensation, the gatekeeper does not have to
come forward and prove her case, as she would have to in the case of a cash prize, and
every cent that she saves for the public shareholders is immediately reflected in the value
of her compensation.
Last, but not least, reverse monitoring can explain why employee stock option
plans are common in pre-IPO ventures and at partially privatized firms. With regard to
pre-IPO ventures,83 stock options to employees promise pre-IPO financial investors (such
as venture capitalists and angel investors) that the firm's workforce will place pressure on
the founders and entrepreneurs heading the firm to go public as early as possible. Since
venture capitalists and other private equity investors hope for a fast exit, large option
grants to many employees serve as a credible commitment from the management of the
venture not to waste the invested funds and to do all that is possible to go public quickly.
Any other behavior would be implausible when the entire firm workforce is vigilantly
watching in the hope of cashing in on the stock component of their pay. Indeed, one
entrepreneur described this feeling as “sitting on a volcano.”84 As for partially privatized
corporations, the reverse monitoring view serves to explain how stock compensation can
overcome a pervasive problem that plagues these firms. The literature explains that
government-owned enterprises under-perform in the market as management often
concentrates on political goals to please the owner.85 Hefty stock compensation to the
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executives and employees of such corporations promises to mitigate this problem and
cause management to stand on guard against self-interested interference from above.

104 J. Pol. Econ. 764, 765 (1996) (suggesting that private firms' efficiency is a result of appointing
managers according to their abilities, whereas management appointments in public firms are political:
"Managers of state firms are selected for their ability to get along with politicians, address political
concerns, and lobby for assistance. In contrast, managers of private firms are selected for their ability to run
them efficiently.").
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